TITLE VII, TITLE IX, OR BOTH?
Kendyl L. Green*
Currently, there is a circuit split regarding whether to apply Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, or both, when an individual alleges discrimination and is an
employee and a student at a federally funded institution. After the recent
case, Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, the First, Third, and Fourth
Circuits correctly held that both Title VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964
and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 apply, but the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits found Title VII to preempt Title IX. Title IX varies
considerably from Title VII. Title IX does not require a claimant to
exhaust the administrative remedies first and there is no damages cap.
Also, if a violation of Title IX is found, federal agencies have a right to
withdraw federal funding to the educational institution. Therefore, an
individual should not be denied the right to bring an independent claim
under both statutes. In order to end the circuit split, the Supreme Court
of the United States should resolve the issue by allowing a plaintiff to bring
a discrimination claim with employment and educational attributes under
both Title VII and Title IX.
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INTRODUCTION

Imagine working on your medical residency and being sexually
harassed by the director of the residency program at a federally funded
hospital. In this situation, you are both an employee of the hospital and a
student completing your education. Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (Title VII) apply, does Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 (Title IX) apply, or do both apply?1
Many individuals bring only Title IX claims because they hope to
surpass Title VII.2 Title VII was created with more of a compensatory
purpose in mind, whereas Title IX was created with the goal to prevent
federal funding of discriminatory institutions.3 Title VII contains “an
express cause of action, provides for [specific] compensatory damages,
and does not rely on a contractual framework.”4 Title VII also requires an
individual to exhaust all the administrative remedies in an administrative
forum first before seeking judicial relief.5 Conversely, Title IX does not
require a claimant to exhaust the administrative remedies first, there is no
damages cap, and if a violation of Title IX is found, federal agencies have
a right to withdraw their federal funding to the educational institution.6
For many years, there has been a circuit split on this issue.7 The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits held that Title VII provides the
exclusive remedy for employees alleging discrimination on the basis of
sex in federally funded educational institutions.8 However, the First,
Fourth, and Third Circuits found that Title IX rights were deemed
independent of and not preempted by Title VII.9
In Part II, Title VII and Title IX are examined. Section “a” discusses
Title VII, Section “b” analyzes Title IX, and Section “c” explains the
differences between the statutes. In Part III, the circuit split is depicted
through the Fifth and Seventh Circuit’s Lakoski v. James and Waid v.
1

20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (2012).
See Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1996); Lakoski v. James,
66 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1995).
3 Hayley Macon, Lisa Mottet, Julia Mujal, & Lara Cartwright-Smith, Introduction to
Title IX, 1 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 424 (2000).
4 Id.
5 See Waid, 91 F.3d at 857; Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 751.
6 See Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, 850 F.3d 545 (3d Cir. 2017). The ability
for a federal agency to withdraw their funding under Title IX is seen as a contract. It is
understood from the statute that when an educational institution accepts federal funding,
any violation of Title IX will result in a loss of the funding.
7 See Waid, 91 F.3d at 857; Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 751; Preston v. Com. of Va. Ex Rel.
New River Com. Col., 31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 1994); Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864
F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
8 Waid, 91 F.3d at 857; Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 751.
9 Doe, 850 F.3d at 545; Preston, 31 F.3d at 203; Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 881.
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Merrill Area Pub. Schs., as well as the First, Third and Fourth Circuit’s
Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical
Center, and Preston v. Com. of Va. ex rel. New River Com. Col.10 Finally,
Part IV is the conclusion, which discusses the issue and where the courts
should go from here.
II. TITLE VII AND TITLE IX GENERALLY
Title VII and Title IX are laws used to combat discrimination.11 Title
VII protects individuals in the workplace and Title IX covers educational
activities and institutions.12 Below, is a discussion of both Title VII and
Title IX in the context of this circuit split.
A. Title VII History and Rule of Law
Title VII, or 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e, was introduced following racial
oppression and discrimination.13 Because skilled African Americans
threatened the economic well-being of Caucasians, many regulations,
including “Black Codes,” were implemented to eliminate opportunities for
African Americans to use their skills or acquire new ones.14 Even as late
as 1961, African Americans were trained for jobs that were specifically
regulated for a segregated employment market.15 The purpose of Title VII
is to “achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers
that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white
employees over other employees.”16 Specifically, Section 703 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which is amended by Section 107 in 1991, states, “an
unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice.”17
To further reinforce the purpose of Title VII, the Supreme Court in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. declared that the objective was to achieve equal
employment opportunities by eliminating barriers that favor white

10

Doe, 850 F.3d at 545; Waid, 91 F.3d at 857; Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 751; Preston, 31
F.3d at 203; Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 881.
11 20 U.S.C. § 1681; 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (2012).
12 Id.
13 Julius L. Chambers & Barry Goldstein, Title VII: The Continuing Challenge of
Establishing Fair Employment Practice, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 10 (1986).
14 Id. at 11.
15 Id.
16 Douglas P. Ruth, Title VII & Title IX=?: Is Title IX the Exclusive Remedy for
Employment Discrimination in the Educational Sector?, 5 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
185, 188 (1996).
17 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075
(1991).
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employees.18 This is known as disparate impact, which occurs if “neutral
policies or practices ha[ve] a disproportionate, adverse impact on any
protected class, usually minorities or women,” and that impact cannot be
justified by a legitimate business consideration.19 Unlike disparate impact,
disparate treatment is when “an employer impermissibly differentiates
among employees or applicants based on their race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”20 Disparate treatment requires intent, but disparate
impact does not.21 Under Title VII, “practices, procedures, or tests neutral
on their face and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if
they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices.”22 Congress directed the thrust of the act “to the consequences
of employment practices, not simply the motivation.”23 Moreover,
Congress has placed the burden on the employer to show “that any given
requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in
question.”24 This disparate impact cause of action that the Supreme Court
established, and which was codified in Title VII, eliminated unnecessary
non-job-related barriers to equal employment opportunity.25 Congress
intended “to ensure equal employment opportunities for all people by
prohibiting policies and practices that are prejudicial to historically
mistreated groups.”26
A prerequisite to filing a Title VII claim in federal district court is
the exhaustion of administrative remedies.27 Proceedings can be initiated
by either “‘a person claiming to be aggrieved’ or by a member of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).”28 A “claimant may
pursue federal remedies by filing a complaint with the [EEOC].”29 The
EEOC investigates the claim and “if the EEOC finds reasonable cause to
believe the complaint is true it must pursue informal efforts to resolve the

18

Chambers & Goldstein, supra note 13 at 16.
Shaping Employment Discrimination Law, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/1965-71/shaping.html.
20 Gerald S. Hartman & Richard H. Schnadig, 1 Personnel Handbook 36 (1989).
21 See id.
22 Chambers & Goldstein, supra note 13 at 16 (internal citation omitted).
23 Hartman & Schnadig, supra note 20 at 37 (internal citation omitted).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Mark R. Bandsuch, Dressing Up Title VII’s Analysis of Workplace Appearance
Policies, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 288 (2008–09).
27 See Donald W. Nierling, The Role of Preclusion Rules in Title VII: An Analysis of
Congressional Intent Notes, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1473 (1986).
28 George Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 688, 691 (1980)
(internal citation omitted).
29 Nierling, supra note 27 at 1473 (discussing EEOC procedure to investigate Title VII
claims).
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complaint.”30 The “investigation of an EEOC charge should be reasonable
and seek the root source of discrimination.”31 If no resolution is reached,
the EEOC may bring a civil action to have the court enforce its ruling.32
“If the EEOC fails to find probable cause to believe the complaint is true
or decides not to bring an action to enforce its judgment, the EEOC must
issue a right-to-sue letter, entitling the claimant to bring a civil action in
federal district court.”33 If the EEOC fails “to resolve the complaint under
its administrative procedures, or if no action is taken by the EEOC within
180 days of filing, the individual may bring suit in federal district court.”34
Alternatively, a person may bring a discrimination claim with a state
or local authority.35 If an individual is denied relief, he or she may bring
a claim under Title VII.36 “[T]he Supreme Court held that a state
administrative finding of non-discrimination does not preclude a Title VII
suit on the claim where the claimant does not appeal the administrative
body’s decisions through the state court system.”37 Therefore, in both
situations, a claimant may bring suit in federal court to obtain damages
and equitable relief.
B. Title IX Rule of Law
Furthermore, Congress enacted Title IX, or 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), as
a reaction to sex discrimination in educational programs.38 Title IX is
enforced primarily by the Department of Education’s Office for Civil
Rights (“OCR”).39 “It was passed as part of the Education Laws in 1972
after a thorough investigation showed a distinct pattern of sex
discrimination.”40 Title IX states, “No person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”41 The law covers “preschool, elementary and secondary schools, colleges and universities,
vocational and technical schools, community and junior colleges, and

30

Id.
Bradley M. Jones, The Permissible Scope of Title VII Actions, 8 SETON HALL L. REV.
493, 502 (1977) (internal quotations omitted).
32 Nierling, supra note 27 at 1473.
33 Id. (internal citation omitted).
34 Hartman & Schnadig, supra note 20 at 40–41.
35 Id. at 41.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88 (2012).
39 Macon, et al., supra note 3 at 417.
40 Clark C. Griffith, Comments on Title IX, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 57 (2003).
41 20 U.S.C. §1681(a) (2012).
31
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graduate and professional schools.”42 Furthermore, “Individuals who wish
to bring a claim under Title IX must prove that they were subjected to
exclusion from participation in, denial of educational benefits of, or
discrimination ‘under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.’”43 Three elements to establish jurisdiction under
Title IX include: “(1) allegations of discrimination based on sex, (2) within
an education program, (3) which ‘receiv[ed] Federal financial
assistance.’”44 The second and third issues have raised a number of legal
issues.45 For example, some individuals argue how broad “an education
program” may extend and, also, whether being a “[recipient of] Federal
financial ‘assistance’ means that the presence of a dollar of Federal money
anywhere . . . is sufficient to trigger Title IX jurisdiction.”46 Three
methods of enforcing Title IX are making an in-house complaint, filing a
complaint within 180 days of the alleged discrimination with the OCR, or
pursuing a lawsuit in federal district court.47
Both public and private enforcement is available to remedy a
situation. “Within Title IX, Congress created a public remedy that permits
the termination of federal funds when an institution providing educational
programs discriminates against an individual on the basis of sex.”48 Title
IX is thought of as a contract, where federal agencies agree to fund an
educational institution so long as the institution does not violate the
statute.49 If the institution does violate the statute, the agency may revoke
it’s funding.50 After Title IX’s creation, the Supreme Court created a
private right of action in Cannon v. University of Chicago.51 In 1992,
“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court ruled that schools that failed to comply with
Title IX could be sued for compensatory and punitive damages.”52
C. Differences Between Title VII and Title IX
Title VII and Title IX are similar, yet different from each other. As
seen in this circuit split, courts have ruled Title VII preempts Title IX.53
Courts have decided that Title VII guides Title IX claims because it
42

Katherine Levitan, Interrogatories, 25 NASSAU LAW 376 (1978).
Macon, et al., supra note 3 at 420.
44 Linda Jean Carpenter & R. Vivian Acosta, Title IX- Two for One: A Starter Kit of
the Law and a Snapshot of Title IX’s Impact, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 503 (2007).
45 Id.
46 Id. at 504.
47 Id. at 505–06.
48 Macon, et al., supra note 3 at 419.
49 See Doe, 850 F.3d at 545.
50 See id.
51 Id.; Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979).
52 Florencio Ramirez, Title IX, 27 GPSOLO 16, 18 (2010).
53 Macon, et al., supra note 3 at 423–24.
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provides case law dictating the prohibition of sex discrimination.54 Unlike
“Title IX[, which] was enacted to prevent federal funding of
discriminatory actions pursuant to Congress’s spending power, Title VII
was enacted with a compensatory scheme in mind.”55 Even though
individuals employed by educational institutions are covered by the terms
of Title IX, many claims have been filed under Title VII.56 This is because
“Title VII contains an express cause of action, provides for [specific]
compensatory damages, and does not rely on a contractual framework.”57
On the other hand, certain features make an action under Title IX more
attractive. Plaintiffs under Title IX need not exhaust administrative
remedies or receive a “right to sue” letter from an administrative agency.58
Also, Title IX damages vary from Title VII’s. Unlike Title VII, Title IX
has no damages cap.59 Lastly, federal agencies may withdraw their federal
funding under Title IX, but this is not the case under Title VII.60 Title IX
was enacted under the Spending Clause powers, “making it in the nature
of a contract: In accepting federal funds, States agree to comply with its
mandate.”61 Therefore, if an entity agrees to accept federal funds for its
educational program or activity, the federal funds may be revoked if there
is a violation of Title IX.62 Consequently, advantages and disadvantages
exist within both statutes, so an individual should not be barred from
bringing a Title IX claim independently from a Title VII.
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING TITLE VII AND TITLE IX IN
EDUCATIONAL SETTINGS THAT ARE PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS
For years, there has been a circuit split concerning when an
individual wanted to bring both a Title VII and Title IX claim.63 The Fifth
and Seventh Circuits held that Title VII and Title IX claims were not
independent and Title VII preempted Title IX.64 In March 2017, the Third
Circuit joined the First and Fourth Circuits in holding that “Title IX rights
54

Id.
Id.
56 Id. at 424.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 424–25.
59 Macon, et al., supra note 3 at 425.
60 See Doe, 850 F.3d at 552.
61 Id. (explaining that the nature of Title IX is contractual because federal agencies
may withdraw federal funding if there is a violation).
62 Id.
63 John P. Barry & Edna D. Guerrasio, Third Circuit Endorses Title IX and Title VII
Claims of Medical Resident, Publications, PROSKAUER (Mar. 21, 2017),
http://www.proskauer.com/publications/client-alert/third-circuit-recognizes-title-ix-andtitle-vii-claims-of-medical-resident/.
64 Id.
55
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[are] deemed independent of and not preempted by Title VII.”65 Now, the
issue is ripe for consideration by the Supreme Court.66
In the Fifth Circuit case, Lakoski v. James, Professor Dr. Joan
Lakoski, brought a sex discrimination action against the University of
Texas Medical Branch (“the University”) under Title IX when she was
denied tenure.67 Dr. Lakoski was hired as a tenure-track assistant
professor, in the Department of Pharmacology, where she subsequently
sought and was denied a promotion three times.68 The department’s tenure
committee recommended that she not be considered for tenure in the
future. The departmental chairman informed her that the upcoming
appointment would be her last.69 Dr. Lakoski sued the University and
three University officials “alleging that the denial of tenure and her
termination constituted intentional sex discrimination in violation of Title
IX[.]”70
The court held that “Title IX did not provide [the] direct private right
of action to individuals seeking money damages for alleged sex
discrimination by federally funded educational institution[s].”71 The court
explained that Title VII is the exclusive remedy for individuals seeking
employment discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded
educational institutions.72 The Fifth Circuit emphasized its unwillingness
to find an implied private right of action for damages under Title IX for
employment discrimination because “doing so would disrupt a carefully
balanced remedial scheme for redressing employment discrimination by
employers” under Title VII.73 The court limited its holding to only
individuals seeking money damages under Title IX and held that Title IX
does not offer a remedial bypass of Title VII.74 Therefore, because Ms.
Lakoski did not bring a Title VII claim, she was precluded from bring a
Title IX claim.75

65

Id.
Id.
67 Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 751 (discussing claims where Title VII preempts Title IX when
there is strong Title VII claim).
68 Id. at 752.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 751.
71 Id. at 758 (explaining Fifth Circuit’s viewpoint that Title VII preempts Title IX when
there is alleged discrimination for federally funded educational institutions).
72 Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753.
73 Id. at 754 (describing court’s viewpoint of bringing a claim under Title IX as
“violence” that would create a disruption to a “carefully balanced remedial scheme”).
74 Id. at 754 (discussing Fifth Circuit’s opinion that Title VII preempts Title IX in
educational employment discrimination cases).
75 Id.
66
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Similarly, in the Seventh Circuit’s Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs.,
Tana Waid, a long-term substitute junior high school teacher, alleged
Merrill Area Public Schools denied her a full-time teaching position
because of her sex in violation of Title IX.76 After Ms. Waid was
appointed, a member of the faculty died and Ms. Waid assumed his duties
for the rest of the school year.77 Subsequently, the school sought a
permanent replacement for the deceased teacher.78 Ms. Waid applied for
the position, but Richard Bonnell was hired instead.79
As a result, Ms. Waid brought an employment discrimination claim
with a state agency charged with the exclusive power to enforce
Wisconsin’s fair employment law.80 The agency ruled in her favor and
granted her all the remedies available under state law.81 However, these
remedies are not as extensive as those under federal law.82 She sought
these additional remedies and filed a lawsuit in federal court.83 The federal
district court concluded that Ms. “Waid’s pursuit of administrative relief
under state law prevented her from pursuing any of the federal claims.”84
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s ruling and
believed the legal ground for the ruling was unclear.85 It stated that the
“essence of the [district court’s] holding seems to be that Waid’s choice of
a state administrative forum was, in effect, an election of remedies and that
her success in that forum precluded her pursuit of compensatory and
punitive damages under federal law in federal court.”86 The decision
related primarily to issue preclusion and issue preemption.87
The court recognized that the Wisconsin state law provided a
statutory right against sex discrimination in employment, which ran
parallel to the federal statute, Title VII.88 Title VII requires a claimant to
first seek administrative remedies in an administrative forum before
pursuing the rights in court.89 The EEOC may provide this administrative

76 Waid, 91 F.3d at 857 (holding Title VII preempts Title IX and are dependent claims
where individuals are in workplace and educational environment).
77 Id. at 859.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 860.
80 Id. at 859 (state agency is referred to as the Equal Rights Division in this case).
81 Id.
82 Waid, 91 F.3d at 859.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 759.
85 Id. at 860.
86 Id.
87 Id. (discussing district court’s decision referencing issue preclusion but appellate
court believed district court’s reasoning implied claim preclusion too).
88 Waid, 91 F.3d at 861.
89 Id.

10

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 14:1

forum, but if a state agency stands as the local equivalent, a plaintiff with
Title VII claims may have to first seek relief from state administrators who
act under state law.90 Thus, Title VII is a remedy for “victims of
employment discrimination who cannot obtain complete redress for their
injuries in an administrative forum, whether the agency providing
administrative redress is a creature of state or federal government.”91
Additionally, Title IX provides that an educational institution or activity
may lose funds provided by federal agencies if there is a violation of Title
IX.92 The court recognized that Ms. Waid was an employee of an
educational institution receiving federal funds, which gave her a private
right of action under Title IX.93
However, the Seventh Circuit examined “whether Waid’s choice to
bring claims in a state administrative forum that could not consider Title
IX claims preclude[d] her from raising those claims in a judicial forum.”94
The court believed, according to the Second Restatement of Judgments,
the plaintiff must assert her “claims initially in the forum with the broadest
possible jurisdiction.”95 If a plaintiff has an unconstrained choice to bring
all her claims in a forum of limited or broad jurisdiction and she chooses
the limited venue, this “precludes her from bringing the unlitigated claims
in a subsequent proceeding.”96 However, the Equal Rights Division’s
exclusive jurisdiction over Waid’s state claims made it evident that she
could not have consolidated her claims in a single lawsuit.97 Therefore,
“the decision of her state administrative proceeding does not [alone]
preclude her claims arising under federal law.”98 The court further noted
that “Wisconsin requires that its courts consider a variety of factors when
determining whether to give issue preclusion effect to the unreviewed
decision of a state administrative agency.”99
Those factors include the following: (1) the ability of the party
against whom preclusion is sought to obtain judicial review of the
decision; (2) differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures
followed by the agency and the court; (3) differences in the standards of
90

Id.
Id. (discussing purpose of bringing Title VII claims in federal court).
92 Id. at 862. (“The creation of this incentive indicates that Congress intended to place
the burden of compliance with civil rights law on the educational institutions themselves,
not on the individual officials associated with those institutions.”).
93 Id. at 861.
94 Waid, 91 F.3d at 863.
95 Id. at 865 (explaining plaintiff must initially bring all claims in broad forum when
she has a choice).
96 Id. at 864–65.
97 Id. at 865.
98 Id. at 866.
99 Id.
91
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proof required by the agency and the court; (4) policy considerations that
would make the application of issue preclusion fundamentally unfair.100
After the court evaluated these factors, it found that the “Equal
Rights Division’s factfinding on the issue of discrimination should
preclude the relitigation of the issue, [whether Ms. Waid was
discriminated against,] because the school system had the opportunity to
seek judicial review of the agency’s decision, but it declined to do so.”101
Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit held that the Equal Rights Division’s
decision precluded the question of whether there was discrimination, but
not whether it intended to discriminate against Ms. Waid.102 It also
believed that Congress intended Title VII to be the exclusive way to
vindicate a right and, therefore, Title VII preempted Title IX.103
Conversely, in the Fourth Circuit case, Preston v. Com. of Va. ex rel.
New River Com. Col., Susan Preston, the community college student
support services counselor, brought action against New River Community
College alleging that it violated Title VII and Title IX because it retaliated
against her for filing an employment discrimination claim based on gender
and race.104 She alleged the college failed to award her the positions of
counselor for student development and activities counselor due to her
previous discrimination charge with the EEOC.105 However, a jury had
concluded that “Preston would not have received the position even if the
college had not discriminated against her.”106 The Fourth Circuit held that
the determination by the jury that she would not have been awarded the
position of activities counselor in the absence of the College’s retaliation
did not foreclose Preston from being entitled to pursue relief under Title
IX.107 Subsequently, the court examined “whether [it] should construe
Title IX as Title VII was construed at the time the events underlying this
action occurred or whether [it] should construe [Title IX] in accordance
with the way Title VII has been amended by Congress in the interim.”108
The Fourth Circuit found that “applying an interpretation of Title IX in
100 Waid, 91 F.3d at 866 (declaring Wisconsin rules for determining whether issue
preclusion should give effect to unreviewed decision of state administrative agency).
101 Id.
102 Id. at 867.
103 Id. at 862. This case was abrogated, but is still used for the Title VII and Title IX
circuit split.
104 Preston, 31 F.3d at 203–04 (discussing discrimination claims where Title VII does
not preempt Title IX because the claims are independent).
105 Id. (discussing alleged retaliatory discrimination when College failed to hire Ms.
Preston because of her previous discrimination claims).
106 Id. at 205.
107 Id. at 208–09.
108 Id. at 207 (discussing whether Title IX should be construed according to VII at the
time of the events or by the way Title VII has been amended by Congress in interim).
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accordance with Title VII as amended by the [Civil Rights Act of 1991]
(“CRA”) to conduct occurring before the effective date of the amendment
would amount to an impermissible retroactive application.”109 Therefore,
even though there was not a settled interpretation by the Supreme Court at
the time the conduct occurred, the court of appeals believed that a Title IX
employment discrimination claim should be interpreted in accordance
with the principles governing Title VII.110 However, the court noted that
these claims are still independent from each other.111 Nevertheless, the
court concluded that since Ms. Preston would not have received the
position of activities counselor even if she had not filed the discrimination
claim in 1984, the college did not ultimately violate Title IX.112
Additionally, in Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, the First Circuit
found that Annabelle Lipsett, a resident in the General Surgery Residency
Training Program, made a prima facie case of hostile work environment,
quid pro quo sexual harassment, and discriminatory discharge.113 The
residency program integrated the surgical training programs of San Juan
Veterans Administration Hospital and the Hospital at the University of
Puerto Rico.114 Ms. Lipsett claimed “that the predominant professional
view of surgery [was] . . . a medical field appropriate only for men[,
which] made it difficult, and at times impossible, for her to gain
acceptance and respect in the [p]rogram.”115 Also, the residents made
sexual comments towards Ms. Lipsett, and nicknamed her “Selastraga,”
meaning “she swallows them.”116 Two supervisory residents filed
complaints against Ms. Lipsett, accusing her of admitting patients to her
ward without first consulting the senior resident, creating friction among
the residents, failing to inform her superiors of the results of analyses
performed on patients, being late, and having unauthorized absences.117
Shortly after, Ms. Lipsett was dismissed from the program.118
The First Circuit analyzed whether “the Title VII standard [of
disparate treatment, which proves discrimination,] . . . should apply as
109

Id. at 208.
Preston, 31 F.3d at 206.
111 Id. at 205 (holding Title IX is independent from Title VII and Title VII does not
preempt Title IX).
112 Id. at 208.
113 Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 881.
114 Id. at 886. This case discusses the court’s decision that Title VII does not preempt
Title IX. The court found the claims to be independent.
115 Id. (illustrating sex discrimination under Title VII and Title IX when women were
treated inferior and threatened with dismissal).
116 Id. at 888 (discussing sexual harassment and hostile work environment under Title
VII and Title IX when Ms. Lipsett was sexually harassed during her residency).
117 Id. at 891.
118 Id. at 892.
110
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well to claims of sex discrimination arising under Title IX.”119 The court
agreed with the Tenth Circuit that since “‘Title VII prohibits the identical
conduct prohibited by Title IX, i.e., sex discrimination,’ it would regard
Title VII ‘as the most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX’s
substantive standards.’”120 Therefore, Title VII case law may be used for
Title IX claims.121 A prima facie case of quid pro quo harassment under
Title IX consists of a showing that “(1) [the plaintiff] was subject to
unwelcome sexual advances by a supervisor or teacher and (2) that his or
her reaction to these advances affected tangible aspects of his or her
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or
educational training.”122 Additionally, to make out a prima facie case of
hostile environment, the plaintiff must show that he or she was subjected
to unwelcome sexual advances “sufficiently ‘severe or pervasive’ that
[they] altered his or her working or educational environment.”123 To have
a cause of action for sexual harassment under Title IX, “an educational
institution is liable upon a finding of hostile environment sexual
harassment perpetrated by its supervisors upon employees if an official
representing that institution knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care,
should have known, of the harassment’s occurrence, unless that official
can show that he or she took appropriate steps to halt it.”124
The First Circuit found that surgery residents, who were not named
as defendants, committed most, if not all, of the alleged acts of harassment
and discrimination.125 Consequently, the court examined to what extent
may the named defendants be held liable for the acts of others under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.126 The First Circuit rejected the district court’s finding that
no affirmative link existed among the participants in the alleged
wrongdoing and the defendants who did not partake in the incident.127
First, the doctors’ failure to “investigate and put a stop to the harassment
directed against the plaintiff[,] constituted ‘gross negligence amounting to
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Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 896.
Id.
121 Id. at 897 (discussing their reliance on the EEOC’s guideline called the “Procedures
for Complaints of Employment Discrimination Filed Against Recipients of Federal
Financial Assistance”).
122 Id. at 898.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 901 (finding employer liable for hostile environment sexual harassment under
Title IX “if the employer knew or should have known of the harassment, and took no
effectual action to correct the situation”).
125 Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 899.
126 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
127 Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 902.
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deliberate indifference.’”128 Second, it found “that the complaints directed
against the plaintiff by the male residents were so infused with
discriminatory bias as to render them pretextual,” and that the doctors had
reason to “suspect this pretext but[,] nevertheless[,] used these complaints
as a basis for discharging her from the [p]rogram.”129
The appellate court found “that there was sufficient evidence in the
record from which it could be inferred that the atmosphere described by
the plaintiff was so blatant as to put the defendants on constructive notice
that sex discrimination permeated the [p]rogram.”130 One of the doctors
admitted in his deposition that he heard residents and attendings make
remarks that “women should not be general surgeons.”131 Also, the
plaintiff spoke with the lead doctors about the dynamics of the program
including hostility from the male residents toward the women becoming
doctors.132 Ms. Lipsett further described that the male residents treated her
with animosity due to her refusal to succumb to their sexual advances.133
Additionally, Ms. Lipsett told the lead doctor about the harassment.134
When she was dismissed, this lead doctor even stated that “there was some
type of behavior that made . . . [Ms. Lipsett] uncomfortable.”135
The court reasoned that “[b]elittling comments about a person’s
ability to perform on the basis of that person’s sex, are not funny.”136
Despite the plaintiff’s allegations, the doctors did not take any steps to
investigate the allegations or resolve them.137 The doctors’ “reliance could
be characterized as an act of complicity amounting to the ‘supervisory
encouragement or condonation of or acquiescence in the residents’
discriminatory behavior.”138 Therefore, the First Circuit found that these
facts were true and that the defendants failed to stop or investigate the
sexual harassment against the plaintiff.139 Ultimately, the First Circuit
held that there was a prima facie case of a hostile work environment, quid
128

Id. at 903 (discussing sexual harassment including threats, sexual advances,
degrading pinups, and hostile behavior where the doctors failed to investigate or stop these
occurrences).
129 Id.
130 Id. at 906.
131 Id. (explaining offensive atmosphere where male residents attacked plaintiff on her
capabilities because she was a woman) (internal quotations omitted).
132 Id. at 907.
133 Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 907.
134 Id. (discussing instance where Ms. Lipsett told lead doctor she was experiencing
harassment and lead doctor did not resolve or investigate situation).
135 Id. at 906 (internal quotations omitted).
136 Id. at 907 (displaying First Circuit’s strong opinion regarding Ms. Lipsett’s sexual
harassment claims).
137 Id.
138 Id. at 911 (internal quotation marks omitted).
139 Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 914.
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pro quo sexual harassment, actual and constructive knowledge of the
plaintiff’s allegation of harassment, and a claim of discriminatory
discharge that could be viewed independently under both Title VII and
Title IX.140
The Third Circuit ended the even split and ruled, along with the First
and Fourth Circuits, that rights under Title VII and Title IX are
independent from each other and Title IX is not preempted by Title VII.141
In the Third Circuit, “the [district] courts held conflicting decisions.142
Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, which discussed whether a
medical resident alleging sexual harassment and retaliation should be
treated as: “(i) an employee who can seek relief under Title VII; (ii) a
student who can seek relief under Title IX; or (iii) both,” resolved the
conflict.143 Aligning the Third Circuit with the First and Fourth Circuits,
the court in Doe decided that sexual harassment and retaliation should be
viewed separately through both Title VII and Title IX.144
In Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., the court decided “whether an
ex-resident . . . can bring private causes of action for sex discrimination
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681
et seq., against Mercy Catholic Medical Center, a private teaching hospital
operating a residency program.”145 A residency program is “a period of
clinical didactic and clinical instruction in a medical specialty during
which physicians prepare for independent practice after graduating from
medical school.”146 Doe alleged that the director of Mercy’s residency
program, Dr. James Roe, sexually harassed her and retaliated against her
because she complained about his behavior, which resulted in her
dismissal.147 Doe sued Mercy in the district court under Title IX for
retaliation, quid pro quo harassment, and hostile environment.148 She
conceded she never filed a charge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 with the EEOC.149 The district court held that Title IX does not
apply to Mercy because it is not an educational program or activity under
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Id. at 914–15.
Barry & Guerrasio, supra note 63.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Doe, 850 F.3d at 545 (discussing resident who is employed for educational program
where Title VII does not preempt Title IX and the issues are independent claims).
146 Id. at 550 (illustrating Doe is both student and employee because she is working at
a hospital for her education).
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148 Id. at 552.
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20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).150 Even if Title IX did apply, the court did not
believe it could use Title IX to circumvent Title VII’s administrative
requirements.151
On appeal, the Third Circuit examined “whether Title IX applies to
Mercy [and] whether Doe’s private causes of action are cognizable under
Title IX.”152 First, the Third Circuit considered whether Mercy’s resident
program made the hospital an “‘educational program or activity’ under
Title IX.”153 The court discussed that Title IX was enacted under the
Spending Clause and, therefore, operates like a contract. Specifically,
when states accept federal funds, they agree to comply with Title IX’s
mandate.154 Consequently, if an entity agrees to accept federal funds for
its educational program or activity, the federal funds may be revoked if
there is a violation of Title IX.155 The court explained that “Title
IX’s . . . (express) enforcement mechanism is through agencies’
regulation of federal funding.156 Unlike the district court which
differentiated Mercy from an educational program or activity because
“residents already have a degree, don’t pay tuition, and are paid for their
services and protected by labor laws,” the court of appeals believed Mercy
did qualify.157 Because Congress “expressly exempted specific kinds of
programs from Title IX’s reach[,] . . . [the court was] hesitant to impose
further restrictions without strong justification from Title IX’s text.”158 An
entity qualifies for federal funding so long as “one can reasonably consider
its mission to be, at least in part, educational.”159 Because Mercy’s
residence program was affiliated with Drexel Medicine, a university
program, the court found it reasonable that Mercy’s mission was
educational under Title IX.160

150 Id. The district court used the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss
this claim.
151 Doe, 850 F.3d at 552. Regardless, the district court had dismissed all of Ms. Doe’s
Title IX claims.
152 Id.
153 Id. (explaining requirement to seek relief under Title IX where Mercy must be
educational program or activity).
154 Id. (discussing Title IX where the nature of statute is contract because federal
agencies may withdraw federal funding if there is a violation).
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Doe, 850 F.3d at 554 (discussing district court’s belief that Mercy is not an
educational program or activity where residents have degree, do not pay tuition, and are
paid for services and protected by labor laws).
158 Id. at 555.
159 Id. at 557; See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 37b(b)(1)(B)(i) (“A ‘graduate medical education
program’ is a ‘residency program’ for ‘medical education and training.’”).
160 Id. at 556.
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Furthermore, the court considered whether Doe’s private causes of
action were cognizable under Title IX. “Title VII’s concurrent
applicability does not bar Doe’s private causes of action for retaliation and
quid pro quo harassment under Title IX.”161 The court of appeals derived
four guiding principles including (1) “private-sector employees aren’t
‘limited to Title VII’ in their search for relief from workplace
discrimination;” (2) “it is a matter of ‘policy’ left for Congress’s
constitutional purview whether an alternative avenue of relief from
employment discrimination might undesirably allow circumvention of
Title VII’s administrative requirements;” (3) “the provision implying Title
IX’s private cause of action, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), encompasses
employees, not just students;” and (4) “Title IX’s implied private cause of
action extends explicitly to employees of federally-funded education
programs who allege sex-based retaliation claims under Title IX.”162
Therefore, Doe has a private retaliation claim under Title IX because a
federal funded recipient, an employee of the residency program, retaliated
against her for making accusations of sex discrimination.163
“Whether . . . [Doe] could also proceed under Title VII is of no moment”
because Congress created different remedies that overlap to eradicate
private sector employment discrimination.164 Therefore, Doe could have
also proceeded under Title IX for her quid pro quo sexual harassment
claim.165
The court ultimately held that Doe’s medical residency program at
the Mercy Catholic Medical Center hospital, which accepted federal
funding through Medicare and was affiliated with Drexel University
Medical Center, qualified as an educational program or activity under Title
IX.166 Additionally, Doe’s concurrent employee status, which fell under
Title VII, did not preclude her from bringing a private cause of action
under Title IX.167 Therefore, the Third Circuit’s holding aligns with the
First and Fourth Circuit’s decisions that Title VII does not preempt Title
IX and these claims may be considered independently.
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Id. at 560.
Id. at 562.
163 See Doe, 850 F.3d at 563–64. The court discusses the definition of intentional
discrimination where a “funding recipient retaliates against a ‘person,’ including an
employee, because she complains of sex discrimination.”
164 Id. at 564 (discussing plaintiff’s right to bring Title VII and Title IX claim
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165 Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For decades, there has been a circuit split when a situation with
alleged discrimination involves education and employment. After Doe v.
Mercy Catholic Medical Center, the First, Third, and Fourth Circuits
correctly held that both Title VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964 and Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 apply, but the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits found Title VII to preempt Title IX.168 Title IX is substantially
different from Title VII.169 Title IX does not require a claimant to exhaust
the administrative remedies first, there is no damages cap, and if a
violation of Title IX is found, federal agencies have a right to withdraw
their federal funding to the educational institution.170 Consequently, an
individual should not be denied the right to bring an independent claim
under both statutes.171 In order to end the circuit split, the Supreme Court
of the United States should resolve the issue by allowing a plaintiff to bring
a discrimination claim with employment and educational attributes under
both Title VII and Title IX.172 Hopefully, the recent Doe ruling is
indicative of a new trend and will foster enough conversation to bring this
issue to the Supreme Court.173

168 Doe, 850 F.3d at 545; Waid, 91 F.3d at 857; Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 751; Preston, 31
F.3d at 203; Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 881.
169 See Doe, 850 F.3d at 545.
170 Id. (discussing differences between Title VII and Title IX where an individual
should have a right to bring both claims separately).
171 See id.
172 20 U.S.C. § 1681; 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2.
173 Doe, 850 F.3d at 545.

